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Introduction
One of the most controversial aspects of the Kosovo air campaign of
the spring of 1999 was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s
policy t o minimize casualties among its forces. Though i t i s hardly
surprising that a party to an armed conflict would seek to limit their
potential military losses, the particular methods of doing so were sharply
criticized i n this instance. Specifically singled out was the tactic that
generally restricted NATO warplanes t o flying above 15,000 feet, an
altitude a t which the threat posed b y Serb a i r defenses markedly
diminished b u t which also reportedly made discrimination between
military forces and civilian noncombatants more difficult. Also questioned
was NATO's decision to forgo a ground invasion in the hopes of achieving
its objectives without the casualties a land assault was expected to produce.
Critics claim that NATO's high-altitude attacks failed to stop the Serbs
from completing their ethnic cleansing campaign. They also assert that the
approach produced unnecessarily misdirected bombs that resulted i n
needless casualties among civilians i n b o t h Kosovo a n d Serbia.
Furthermore, they charge that at the end o f the conflict Serb troops
responsible for atrocities were able to leave the province largely unscathed
and unrepentant despite the seventy-eight day air bombardment.1 These
allegations raise doubts in some quarters about the martial ethos of U.S. and
other NATO forces, and have made the military success look hollow. As one
pundit remarked, "can Western forces unwilling to sacrifice a single life to
save the Kosovar Albanians truly label the air war a victory?"2
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This article examines the issue o f casualty aversion from several
perspectives. Initially, it critically examines popular assumptions about the
relative merits of high altitude attacks, as well as the efficacy of ground
assaults in limiting noncombatant casualties. Next, it will discuss casualty
aversion in the context of the American military ethos. It will conclude by
offering some observations about casualty aversion and the involvement of
American troops in future use of force situations.

A New American Military Ethos?
The Air Campaign
Evaluating the status of the American military ethos post-Kosovo can
begin with a basic question: Did the policy that kept most of the warplanes
at high altitude portend any change in the ethos of the American military
as the critics suggest? Retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Paul Van
Riper seems to think so:
What really troubles me is that those who take an oath to defend
others were held out of harm's way while the very people they were
to defend were in many ways viewed as expendable. What does this
say [about] the Western warrior ethic for the future?3

The short answer to General Van Riper's question is: not as much as
some may think. To understand why, it is important to analyze with some
specificity the genesis of the casualty aversion thesis. First, to the extent it
existed at all, it dwelt almost exclusively in the minds of high-level civilian
and military leaders, not the airmen actually flying combat missions or the
soldiers on the ground.4 There are virtually no reports that those who
would actually go in harm's way entertained any reluctance to personally
engage the enemy at close quarters.5 Thus, at the combatant level—where
ethos really counts—there is no evidence of any erosion of a disposition to
take risks to attack enemy forces. To the contrary, many of the combatants
(and especially the Army's Apache unit) expressed great frustration at
being denied the opportunity to do so.
Second, the idea that the air war in Kosovo was a risk-free affair for
the aircrews is misperceived. The mere presence over hostile territory in a
complex, high-performance warplane loaded w i t h explosives i s a
dangerous activity under any circumstances. The "friction of war" alone
courts disaster. Many have incorrectly reverse-engineered the bloodless
outcome to impute an absence of martial virtue. Brigadier General Daniel

P. Leaf, commander of the 34th Aerospace Expeditionary Wing during the
Kosovo conflict points out the error of this logic: "The risk is not defined
by the results.... Our airmen made i t look easy but i t wasn't."6 For
example, during the operation, Serb forces launched some 700 surface-toair missiles at NATO planes.7
Moreover, it does not seem to be well understood that lower altitude
attacks were, in fact, attempted but they "did not seem very effective."8
Indeed, the nature o f modern precision munitions is such that they are
often optimally targeted at the altitudes NATO employed.9 Among other
things, higher altitude allows the pilots to concentrate on the targeting
process; conversely, flying lower can b e quite distracting. Michael
Ignatieff reported in The New Yorker:
In reality, pilots frequently flew below the fifteen-thousand foot
ceiling but soon discovered that, in [General Wesley] Clark's words,
"flying low doesn't pay." Pilots breaking out below cloud formations
in mountainous terrain at five hundred knots could focus only on
staying airborne.M

Third, in Kosovo the Serbs made extensive use not just of cover and
camouflage, but also of human shields.11 An adversary who defends with
this tactic virtually ensures some noncombatant casualties. Avoiding them
entirely in such situations would require an attacker to have a precision far
beyond the capability of the most discrete weaponry available, regardless
of the altitude from which the munition is launched.
Fourth, flying low enough to gain some greater degree of accuracy can
engage the law of unintended consequences. Lower altitudes would have
given Serbia's numerous but less capable antiaircraft gun and short-range
missile systems a chance for success—and this would not necessarily bode
well for those on the ground. A crippled twenty- or thirty-ton airplane
loaded with fuel and high explosives crashing out-of-control into an urban
neighborhood can create as much or more devastation among civilians as
any errant bomb.
Finally, i n a report otherwise critical o f the air campaign, Human
Rights Watch (HRW)12 cited only one instance where "flying at a higher
altitude seems to have impeded a pilot from adequately identifying a
target. . " Although it alludes that there were others, given the level o f
specificity elsewhere i n the report, the absence o f further examples
supports a conclusion that the high-altitude operations did not have the
adverse effect popular wisdom attributes to them.

A Ground Assault?
The realities of modern combat likewise do not suggest that a ground
assault would have saved civilian lives. Frankly, i t is puzzling to the
military professional that anyone concerned with the sanctity of human life
could conceive that such an operation would be less deadly than the air
campaign t h a t d i d t a k e place. M a n y o f t h e weapons o f l a n d
warfare—artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and even machine guns and
other small aims--lack the precision capability common to much of the airdelivered ordnance in the U.S. arsenal. Virtually every military expert
today concedes that ground combat—especially in an urban environment—is
a casualty-intensive affair for both combatant and noncombatant alike. The
horrific scenes coming out of Grozny in Chechnya are but one example of
how brutal this kind of warfare can get. To the combatant in a ground
campaign every structure is a potential ambush source and must be treated
as such by attacker and defender alike. For civilians caught in the middle,
there is often literally no place to hide.
It is especially important to understand that the nature o f ground
combat moves many use of force decisions to a lower level in the military
hierarchy, and this is not always a good thing for the civilian populace. In
air warfare an officer-pilot flying above the fray and supported by an array
of sophisticated intelligence-gathering and targeting technologies makes
the decision to fire a weapon. In ground combat that decision is in the
hands of a young soldier in the midst of the terrifying confusion and stress
of the land battle. Tragedies can result as historian Stephen Ambrose
records:
When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, or twenty years old,
in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, sometimes terrible
things happen that you wish never happened. This is a reality that
stretches across time and continents. It is a universal aspect of war,
from the time of the ancient Greeks up to the present.13

Still, there are those who will contend that a credible ground threat
would have forced Serb forces to come out of hiding and mass their troops,
thus presenting airpower an inviting target. Though this thesis is attractive
and soundly applicable in many cases, it is unlikely to have changed the
outcome in Kosovo. Specifically, it appears now that most of the ethnic
cleansing activity was complete prior to the start of the air campaign. The
propriety of the delay in the political decision to use force is beyond the
scope of this paper, but it seems churlish to challenge an effort to explore

every possible alternative before resorting to force just because—with
hindsight—the peace effort was doomed to failure.
What is more is that this contention assumes the Serbs would respond
to the ground threat with orthodox military maneuvers compatible with
Western notions o f ethical conduct in war. Regrettably, there is little to
support such a conclusion. It seems probable that the Serbs would have
quickly realized that massing their forces to confront a NATO invasion
would be militarily catastrophic. Instead of doing so, they may well have
engaged in guerrilla warfare tactics and employed them in such a way as
to put civilians at most risk. Among other things, they would likely have
expanded upon the human shield tactics that served them so well during
the air campaign—a development that could have significantly increased
the danger to Kosovar civilians or even captured NATO troops.

Casualty Aversion and American Culture
Despite the dearth o f evidence to support the notion that a new
American military ethos is emerging as a result of the casualty aversion
policies employed during the Kosovo conflict, a re-examination o f that
ethos is still warranted as i t may well be misunderstood. Actually, the
American military ethos is largely built on the sanctity of all human life,
combatant and noncombatant alike. The law of armed conflict (LOAC) is
essentially i n accord with this approach. Although L O A C obviously
prohibits the targeting of bona fide noncombatants, it does not per se place
a higher value on the lives of civilians over those in uniform. There is, of
course, a significant b o d y o f both conventional a n d customary
international law that seeks to shield noncombatant civilians from the
adverse effects of war, but nothing in that legal regime expressly requires
an assumption of more risk by a combatant than a noncombatant.
Furthermore, the military tradition of the United States does not offer
much support for the notion that the lives o f the members o f its armed
forces are any more dispensable than those o f enemy noncombatants.
Russell F. Weigley, in his treatise The American Way o f War, discusses
"wars of annihilation" where enemy noncombatants were sacrificed when
necessary to end conflicts without further risk to U.S. troops.14 A classic
illustration is the use of atomic weapons against Japan despite the prospect
(and eventual reality) of thousands of enemy noncombatant casualties.15
That decision was principally sourced in a desire to avoid what surely
would have been the deaths of thousands of U.S. troops (not to mention
Japanese soldiers and civilians) if the planned invasion of Japan took place.

This disposition to so readily balance potential military losses against
expected enemy civilian fatalities is rooted deep in the American psyche.
Essentially, Americans do not instinctively draw a distinction that finds its
soldiers' lives less precious than those of the citizens of an enemy state.
This is traceable to the American concept of who composes its military:
citizens with just as much right to life as enemy citizens. From the Nation's
very beginning it rejected for its military the model of an armed force
composed of professional hirelings expected to do the state's bidding at
whatever risk for whatever purpose simply because they were paid to do
so.

To the contrary, the persisting ideal o f the American-at-arms is the
altruistic yeoman farmer who lays down his plow to take up arms for the
duration, always nevertheless intending to return to the responsibilities of
family and farm at the very first opportunity. It would be a great mistake
to underestimate how deeply embedded this archetype still remains i n
American culture. Consider that for the bulk of U.S. history the nation
rarely maintained significant standing military forces. Instead, vast
numbers of mobilized reserves, volunteers, or conscripts augmented rather
small cadres of professional soldiers when needed to fight wars. It is only
with the onset of the Cold War that the United States maintained a sizable
military force i n peacetime. Even that military, however, was largely
composed o f short-term conscripts until the advent of the All-Volunteer
Force (AVF) in 1973.
Despite the predictions of many, the AVF never evolved into a military
that saw itself as anything other than patriotic citizens in the service o f
their country. The U.S. military today is very much one where notions of
citizenship and individual rights are quite strong, and its perspective in that
regard scarcely differs from that of the populace at large. Few in the U.S.
military—to include the AVF—expect to end their days in a corner of the
regimental mess still in uniform; rather, virtually all harbor the dream of
returning to civilian life young enough to be active participants in civic
culture.
While there is a well-entrenched appreciation of loyalty, self-sacrifice,
and duty in the U.S. military, it is nevertheless not an institution of the
"legionnaire" variety that understands itself as an wholly expendable tool
of government. Instead, i n many key respects the concept o f citizensoldier—and the intellectual egalitarianism it breeds—remains robust in U.S.
forces. While the American serviceman is cognizant of the ever-present
obligation to make the ultimate sacrifice to defend the nation, that is not
quite the same thing as viewing oneself as being inherently any less worthy
of life than an enemy civilian.

This context directly affects the Nation's approach t o casualty
aversion. There is no groundswell anywhere in the U.S. for its military to
take unnecessary risks simply to save enemy civilians. To the American
way of thinking, their citizens—who just happen to be wearing uniforms for
a time—are just as valuable as enemy civilians. The throngs who visit the
Vietnam Veterans' Memorial—a monument t o l o s t war—llustrate a
relationship with those who serve almost without parallel elsewhere in the
world. To Americans, those wearing uniforms collectively are the most
trusted part of the citizenry well ahead of organized religion, universities,
and every branch of govemment.16 Under these circumstances it is not
surprising that savvy U.S. politicians are quick to embrace policies that
seek to avoid needless deaths among a military so treasured b y the
American people.
The deeply-embedded concept o f the citizen-soldier may be one
reason the U.S. has been unwilling (in contrast to some developed nations)
to recruit legions o f foreigners to f ill the ranks o f their armed forces.
Instead, America relies on her citizenry and is unwilling to risk those
citizens lightly. Thus, the U.S. military ethos—which fully complies with
LOAC—may well continue to view the sanctity o f the lives o f military
personnel on a fully equal basis to those of enemy civilians.
Casualty Aversion and the Imperatives of Democracy
Clearly, other factors are involved in the casualty aversion equation. It
is accurate, for example, to say that the political fallout from incidents like
the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the 1993 killing of
eighteen soldiers in Somalia, and the 1996 bombing of the Kohbar Towers
barracks in Saudi Arabia has left U.S. leaders both in and out of uniform
much more wary of incurring casualties in operations abroad. Despite polls
suggesting the American public may be more tolerant of casualties than are
their leaders," it is a well-founded article of faith that once the casualties
start occurring, support can decline rapidly.18
Given that public support, especially in a democracy, is the sine qua
non of a military effort, it is easily understood why leaders give priority to
force protection. In operations where the connection to the vital interests
of the United States is not readily apparent, policies aimed at limiting
casualties may be the only realistic way to garner enough political capital
to proceed. Humanitarian interventions in places like Kosovo with little
direct social, economic, or political affinity with the U.S. electorate may be
sustainable only i f the sacrifice in American blood is minimized.
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Importantly, U.S. courts acknowledge the legitimacy of the casualty
aversion policies. I n September of 1999, the all-civilian U.S. Court o f
Appeals for the Armed Forces recognized this political truth in its holding

in United States v. Captain Lawrence P. Rockwood.19 In Rockwood, the
accused was convicted, inter alia, of leaving his place of duty as a counter
intelligence officer tasked with helping to ensure the security of American
troops deployed to Haiti. He abandoned his force protection duties, he
claims, i n order to conduct an "inspection" o f conditions at a Haitian
civilian prison. In essence, Rockwood contended he had a responsibility
towards civilians that trumped his assigned duties relating to the safety of
his fellow soldiers. In dismissing the accused's argument, the Court noted:
The decision to place primary emphasis on force protection.. .is the
type of decision that is within the responsibility of the commander... a
servicemember must obey a commander's decision as to the priority
given to [military] force protection, as opposed to protection of the

civilian population.20
In Rockwood, as well as in the Kosovo campaign, the priority placed
on force protection originated with civilian leaders.21 Hence, the concept
of civilian control of the military—another vital element of the American
military ethos—dictates, as it should, the casualty aversion policies carried
out by military commanders in the field. Despite this, the effect of such
civilian direction concerns some.22 West Point professor Don Snider says
"[w]hat soldiers are now being told is. y o u r first mission i s n o
casualties" and he worries about what this will do "to the ethic of selfsacrifice, when the political guidance is to accept no sacrifice."23
So long as military commanders are giving force protection priority
because i t is the "first mission" assigned by their civilian masters, we
should not worry too much about the effect of the policies on the ethos
generally. Deference to civilian supremacy is a fundamental military virtue
in a democracy. Parenthetically, because o f the potential f o r social
alienation, a democracy obliged to keep huge forces under arms may be
wise to avoid establishing mores that seem to devalue the lives of those in
uniform.24 Still, Professor Snider's concerns are worthy of attention in that
leaders must avoid creating an environment where a priority on force
protection originates with—or i s assumed by—military commanders i n
situations where that emphasis is to the detriment of the specific mission
assigned by civilian authorities. A military culture that implies such a
priority in every instance may well endanger innocents unnecessarily. To
date, however, such fears remain unfounded.

Nevertheless, interpreting the warrior ethos i n a broad context o f
chivalry and honor would still seem to provide an ethical requirement for
altruistic sacrifice to protect the truly innocent, even i f not mandated per
se by law. But there is no indication this precept is anything but an intrinsic
belief o f the U.S. military (as well as the armed forces o f its NATO
partners). Reflecting on the Kosovo conflict, ex-Air Force pilot-turnednovelist Chris Stewart insists:
I...never met a pilot or crewmember in the U.S. Air Force who was
not willing to take at least some risk to avoid being the one to drop
his ordnance atop women, children, hospitals or a passenger train.
That is the way Americans conduct war.25

Although it is almost chic to conclude otherwise, nothing in the aftermath
of Kosovo suggests any alteration in this basic American orientation.

Concluding Observations
The reality of the Kosovo conflict is that notwithstanding criticisms of
NATO's casualty aversion policies, a brutal Serb army was ejected from
the province and nearly a million refugees returned t o their homes.
Moreover, despite the miscues the policies allegedly caused, N AT O
accomplished its mission at the price of relatively few casualties among
any o f the parties. Ironically, the most celebrated tragedy—the mistaken
bombing o f the Chinese Embassy—cannot be attributed t o a casualty
aversion strategy. Of the more than 25,000 weapons used in Kosovo, only
twenty resulted in collateral damage incidents, a phenomenal record in the
history of warfare.26
That such an immense quantum o f combat power was applied so
discretely and with such ultimate success is itself evidence that the ethos
of the armed forces primarily responsible for those unprecedented results
is one to be emulated—not adulterated. It may be that an ethic that equates
the lives o f American servicemen w i t h those o f enemy civilians i s
disquieting to some. But the critics must accept that this ethic works for
American culture—and that culture is the same one that produced the
world's most devastatingly effective military. Absent that military, any
Kosovars who survived Serbia's pogrom likely would have spent the
winter of 1999 and beyond freezing in refugee camps far from home.
Although the U.S. armed forces may have a sense of itself that is more
aggressive and risk-taking than their leaders are inclined to allow, that fact
does not necessarily militate for policies congenial to the military's more

dauntless perspective. In a democracy self-conceptualizations of soldiers
must yield to serve the needs of the civilian authorities, not vice versa.
Political leaders accountable directly or indirectly to the electorate are the
decision-makers best positioned to assess what level of risk is acceptable
to American society in a particular case.
Clearly, challenges remain. The use of force situations that ever more
frequently confront U.S. and other militaries are increasingly complex, and
a very high level of discipline is required. The Rockwood case27 should
serve as a sober warning that individuals within the armed forces may be
inclined t o interpose their own view o f the importance o f civilian
protection in contravention of the policies set by proper authorities. I n
Rockwood the predilection o f the soldier ostensibly favored protecting
civilians, but conceivably it could have just as easily gone the other way.
The point is that such force protection and casualty aversion policies must
originate at the political level (after the considered advice o f military
leaders) and be scrupulously followed by the implementing armed forces.
The reality is that military indiscipline for whatever reason—especially in
complex humanitarian interventions—carries the dangerous potential to
cause events to spin wildly out of control, to the serious detriment of both
the armed forces and those to whom they were sent to aid.
It must be added that the U.S. approach to the use of force emphasizes
the lavish expenditure o f machines instead o f manpower. Accordingly,
technology has always been an intrinsic feature of the American approach
to casualty aversion. From its inception, airpower in particular has always
intended to obviate much of the need for bloodshed in war. But the very
success of technology may well be one source of the theory that casualty
aversion concerns are corrupting military ethos.
Technology is a key reason the U.S. military no longer wages "wars of
annihilation," but in a very real sense, it is a victim of its own success. The
ability to militarily overwhelm its adversaries with stuffing efficiency
causes some to conclude that doing so is somehow unfair or, at least, to use
the absence of bloodshed to infer some deficiency of ethos. In essence, this
is a logical fallacy, that is, assuming as valid a syllogism that concludes
that the lack o f NATO casualties ipso facto proves some measure o f
venality or even cowardice.
It appears that some theorists are not yet able to reconcile the classical
model of military ethos (forged in the courageous endurance of physical
cost and inevitable sacrifice) with modem realities. There are essentially
two related issues in this regard: First, they need to appreciate that in
developed societies like the U.S., it is a feature of modernity that the body
politic values the lives of all its citizens—and those serving in uniform are

proving to be no exception. It no longer easily accepts the inevitability of
loss in war, and demands in that endeavor the kind of efficiency it sees
elsewhere in a high-tech world where technology is reducing costs o f
every kind. Why not fewer lives lost?
Second, many critics do not seem to fully understand the truly
revolutionary impact o f technology on warfare. Today's precision
weaponry and advanced warfighting techniques—especially as developed
and implemented in the U.S. military—make it possible to successfully
apply force in a profoundly asymmetrical way. In so many instances, what
might seem to be courage in the face of vast technological dominance is,
in reality, mere ignorance of the extent of one's inferiority. In truth, the
impact on war of increasingly impersonal and fully automated technology
may produce results that say nothing about the mettle of those who wield
it, or those who feel its sting. Indeed, technology may make, in the end, the
ethos of the combatants, per se, of little importance—or even irrelevant to
the morality of the conflict writ large.
The real focus ought not to be on the ethos of the U.S. armed forces or on second guessing the way it applies combat power (the American
military accomplishes that with a sometimes frightening competence and
ease). Rather, more thinking is merited on whether the sheer efficacy of
America's military power is making the use of force something other than
the blunt instrument of last resort it should be. That is the real question of
ethics and ethos for twenty-first century decision-makers.
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